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INTRODUCTION 
The district court found that the amount of time prevailing counsel spent on the case and 
the requested hourly rate-$125 an hour-were reasonable. Tr. (Dec. 3, 2014), p. 33, LL. 2-20; 
p. 34, LL. 1-8. It nevertheless declined to award the prevailing party-the Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare-fees using that hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours spent. It 
initially did this because it believed that to award more violated a rule of professional conduct 
prohibiting fee-sharing by lawyers. After the Department sought reconsideration of that ruling, 
the district court decided that still, the Department could recover no more than the State's 
internal cost-accounting rate, $51.48 per hour, because, as it said, "[ e ]xcept where the award of 
attorney fees is paid to the lawyer, fees awarded to a party should not exceed the amount the 
client actually paid for the lawyer." Replacement R., p. 125. The court said this was so 
"whether the prevailing party is a government entity or private party." Id. Something other than 
that, the court said, "is an impermissible penalty and does not serve the purpose of simply 
making the receiving party whole." Id. 
In defense of the court's ruling, the providers contend that the district court acted within 
the bounds of its discretion when it awarded the Department $51.48 an hour-$73 an hour less 
than the $125 an hour the Department sought. They explain their view that the court considered 
all the factors in Rule 54(e)(3) and the bases for capping the recoverable hourly rate were 
appropriate discretionary decisions. The measure of attorney fees may be, they say, limited to 
the actual cost of legal services, and the decision whether to measure reasonable fees by the 
prevailing market rate or the actual cost is an appropriate discretionary call that does not conflict 
with§ 12-120(3) or Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(3). 
The providers are mistaken. Abuse of discretion is not another way of saymg 
unreviewable: When a district court relies on the wrong legal standard to make a discretionary 
decision, it abuses its discretion. Golub v. Kirk-Hughes Dev 't, LLC, 158 Idaho 73, 76, 343 P.3d 
1080, 1083 (2015). This Court has free review over questions of law and matters of statutory 
interpretation. Intermountain Real Properties, LLC v. Draw, LLC, 15 5 Idaho 313, 31 7-18, 311 
P.3d 734, 738-39(2013). The only two legal bases the district court cited as justifying its cap on 
the recoverable hourly rate-the fee-sharing problem and the problem of windfalls and 
penalties-are not legally correct. First, awarding prevailing party fees that may exceed the 
party's actual expenditure creates no fee-sharing problem because the rule in question, Rule 5.4 
of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, does not apply where the party, not the lawyer, owns 
the right to the fee award. Rule 5.4 is aimed at preventing non-lawyer, non-client third-parties 
from having a financial interest in the representation in the form of fees paid by the client and 
shared with them by a lawyer. But where the lawyer never sees the fee award, there is no 
sharing of fees by a lawyer with a non-lawyer. Rule 5.4 does not prohibit a statutory fee award 
in litigation that exceeds the amount the party spent on its lawyer. 
Second, awarding the Department $125 an hour does not confer any impermissible 
windfall on the State or exact any unfair penalty on the providers. The statute and rule place the 
focus on the objective reasonableness of the fee award. The nature of the fee agreement is a 
factor to consider, but not to the exclusion of the other factors. The nature of the fee agreement 
may inform reasonableness, but it does not determine it. And the statute is not limited to an 
amount that simply reimburses costs, contrary to the district court's ruling. Reasonableness 
seeks to identify a reasonable value-not necessarily the cost--of the services in the particular 
case, based on the factors identified in Rule 54(e)(3). The district court's reading of§ 12-120(3) 
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to limit fees to the amount spent is erroneous. The providers have no substantial answers for the 
problems their arguments face. This Court should reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand the matter with instructions to award the Department attorney fees of $74,925.00. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AT $51.43 AN 
HOUR IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The district court indicated it had considered all the factors that Rule 54( e )(3) requires. 
Tr. (Dec. 3, 2014), p. 32, LL. 12-16. It found from its consideration of the information before it 
that the time spent and the hourly rate were reasonable. Tr. (Dec. 3, 2014), p. 33, LL. 2-20; p. 
34, LL. 1-8. Each of these factors is expressly provided for in the Rule. Idaho R. Civ. P. 
54(e)(3)(A) (time and labor required); (D) (prevailing charges for like work). The court did not 
identify any factor in the rule that justified awarding fees at less than the $125 an hour that the 
Department requested. Instead, it based that decision solely on its perception that to award more 
constituted impermissible fee sharing under Rule 5.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
that such an award bestowed an unfair windfall to the Department and imposed a penalty to the 
providers. The problem with these determinations, though, is that they are incorrect as a matter 
of law. When they are properly cast aside, there is no other legitimate basis to deny the 
Department an hourly rate of less than it sought. 
A. When the party owns the right to the fee award, awarding that party attorney 
fees exceeding the amount it spent presents no fee-sharing problem. 
The providers do very little in their brief to discuss the fee-sharing issue the district court 
raised other than to say that the district court had "ethical concerns" about awarding the 
Department more than it spent. (They do not even mention Rule 5.4 in their brief, and they do 
not make any argument that an award to the Department the amount requested would violate the 
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rules of professional conduct.) The district court did little to explain its reasoning other than to 
generally mention the prohibition on sharing fees with non-la~,yers. On appeal though, the 
providers say that the Department "brushes aside the district court's ethical concerns of fee-
splitting with non-attorney entities." Respondents' Brief, p. 7 .1 Whatever role the fee-sharing 
problem played in the district court's ultimate decision, it is wrong. 
As the Department pointed out in its opening brief, the district court seemed to retreat 
from its view that the Department's requested reward would constitute impermissible fee 
sharing. Appellants' Brief, p. 6. The Department addressed that concern in a footnote, 
explaining that there is no fee-sharing problem in this case because the fee award is the property 
of the client, and Rule 5.4 is aimed at preventing la~ers from sharing attorney fees paid by 
clients with non-la~er, non-client third parties. Appellants' Brief, p. 6 n.4. Rule 5.4 states that 
"[a] la~er or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonla~er," except for some 
circumstances, inapplicable here, where a la~er may. This limitation plainly protects clients 
from the potential influence over the lawyer that third-party non-client, non-la~ers may obtain 
when those third parties have a financial interest in the fee that is earned by the la~er for 
providing services to the client. It seeks to protect the la~er's professional independence and 
her obligation to the client. The obvious purpose of Rule 5.4 is to eliminate any incentive a 
la~er may have to charge unreasonably high rates or make professional decisions that are not in 
the client's best interests. If, as the Department explained in its brief, the la~er agrees to share 
her fees with a non-la~er, non-client third party, the outside interest in the litigation may 
compromise the la~er's judgment and independence and her obligations. 
1 Pursuant to this Court's order dated October 13, 2015, references to the parties and their briefs are as 
follows: The Department is referred to as the Appellants (and their brief Brief for Appellants) and the 
providers are referred to as the Respondents ( and their brief Brief for Respondents). 
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But here, there is no fee-sharing problem because it is not possible. First, this is an 
attorney fee award paid by the losing side in a case to the winning party. These awards are not 
the same as a lawyer collecting her client's fee from the client and then sharing it with someone 
else, which is what the rule contemplates. Second, the Attorney General is not the recipient of 
the attorney fee award; the State ofldaho is. Under Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ), the prevailing party 
owns the right to the fee award. Because the lawyer never sees the money, he literally cannot 
share it with any non-lawyers. In rejecting an argument that in-house counsel time could only be 
reimbursed according to in-house counsel's salary, the Seventh Circuit has explained it this way: 
[i]f the victorious litigant owns the money representing the market value of the 
legal fees, and may pocket the cash without remitting a cent to the lawyer-who 
may have agreed to work for less, or for free-it is hard to see how there can be a 
fee-splitting objection. The money is not they lawyer's to start with. 
Central States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Cartage Co., 76 F.3d 114, 116 (7th Cir. 
1996). The Court further observed that "how the litigant allocates the money between its legal 
budget is none of the court's business .... " Id. Awarding the Department $125 an hour in 
attorney fees is not impermissible fee-sharing. Accordingly, fee-sharing is not a legitimate basis 
to limit the Department's recovery to the amount it actually spent.2 
I II 
II I 
II I 
2 One case the district court cited, National Treasury Employees Union v. US. Dep 't of the 
Treasury, 656 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1981 ), illustrates the difference between a case like this one, 
and a case where there may be impermissible fee sharing. There, a union hired a lawyer to 
represent a union member under the union's prepaid legal services plan. 656 F.2d at 849. The 
lawyers were compensated by the union at less than the fee request, and the fee award was the 
property of the union, not, apparently, the lawyer or the client. Id. The union was a non-lawyer 
organization and would have received fees for the lawyer's services in excess of the lawyer's 
compensation. Here, though, the entity receiving the award-the State, through the 
Department-is the client. 
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B. Awarding the Department market-based rates that the district court found to be 
reasonable does not constitute a windfall to the Department or a penalty to the 
providers. 
Neither the district court nor the providers offered any authority for the idea that a party 
may recover fees only in an amount equal to what it paid for its lawyers. The district court said 
that "the purpose of attorney fees is to indemnify the prevailing party and not to punish the 
losing party by allowing the winner a windfall profit." Replacement R., pp. 124-25. Awarding a 
party more than it spent, "whether the prevailing party is a government entity or a private party," 
is an "impermissible penalty and does not serve the purpose of simply making the receiving 
party whole." Replacement R., p. 125. The providers' best argument in support of this view is 
that it is just not fair to award a party more than it spent. See Respondents' Brief, p. 13. But not-
fair is not a sufficient argument to overcome the plain language of§ 12-120(3) or this Court's 
cases. 
Section 12-120(3) directs the trial courts to award reasonable attorney fees. Idaho R. Civ. 
P. 54(e)(3) lists several factors for courts to consider in determining a reasonable fee. A 
reasonable fee may be more or less than the agreement between the lawyer and the client. See 
Ada County Hwy. Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,878, 673 P.2d 1067, 1072 (1983), overruled 
in part on other grounds, Dep't of Transp. v. Grathol, 158 Idaho 38, 343 P.3d 480 (2015) (in 
condemnation action, Rule 54(e) factors are appropriately considered; but "[w]e caution that the 
court should not automatically adopt any contingent fee or contractual arrangement, but rather 
the fee awarded may be more or less than that provided in the lawyer-client contract"); see also 
Nalen v. Jenkins, 114 Idaho 973, 976, 114 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Ct. App. 1988) ("we have 
previously ruled that a court is not prohibited from allowing recovery to the prevailing party in 
excess of the amount which the party is contractually obligated to pay his attorney"). And fees 
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may be awarded to a party who incurs no attorney fees at all. Kidwell v. US Marketing, I 02 
.S. 451,631 P.2d 622 (1981); Furtell v. Martin, 100 Idaho 473,600 P.2d 777 (1979). 
The providers do not have an answer to this. The district court's and the providers' 
windfall/penalty problem assumes that § 12-120(3) and Rule 54(e)(3) direct courts to determine 
a fee that reflects the costs incurred by the prevailing party. This assumption is wrong. It 
overlooks the fact that as we have explained, the fee agreement does not necessarily tie the 
court's determination of a reasonable fee. If the district court is right, that a fee award cannot 
exceed what a party actually spent on its layers, then the Court's statements that fees may be 
more or less than the agreed-upon amount between lawyer and client and that a party may 
recover fees even if it has incurred none at all would be wrong. 
Under § 12-120(3 ), the fair expectation of a party is that if it loses, it may end up paying 
"reasonable" attorney fees. If the Court had interpreted "reasonable," as that term is used in 
§ 12-120(3), to mean only the amount the other side's lawyer cost, a fee award exceeding the 
amount paid without justification based on the factors in Rule 54(e)(3) may well be something 
beyond what either party may reasonably expect. But the Court has never interpreted § 12-
120(3) to mean what the district court said it means. So neither party can fairly expect that an 
award of attorney fees will necessarily match the fee agreement. Therefore, there is no windfall 
and no penalty because the parties litigate having evaluated the risk that they may have to pay 
fees that exceed what the other side's lawyer cost. (And conversely, the lawyers know that they 
cannot charge unreasonably high rates and expect district courts to allow them. Idaho R. Profl 
Conduct 1.5.) Parties may rely on the district court to police reasonableness by examining the 
factors in Rule 54(e)(3), but an amount above the fee agreement cannot be unexpected. See 
Illinois v. Sangamo Constr. Co., 657 F.2d. 855,862 (7th Cir. 1981) (no windfall to state to award 
7 
market rates); Corbin v. Tocco, 845 P.2d 513, 518 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). Absent justification to 
award less than an amount the court deemed reasonable, there is no basis to do so.
3 
That is not to say that the amount the party agreed to pay its lawyer is always necessarily 
entirely irrelevant to the reasonableness inquiry. Evidence of the prevailing charges for like 
work (Rule 54(e)(3)(D)) may come from an affidavit of a lawyer familiar with the market and 
the subject matter of the case ( or perhaps the prevailing party's lawyer, as is common). The fee 
agreement itself may be of some relevance to reasonableness in some circumstances. A client 
voluntarily agreeing to pay a lawyer a certain hourly rate may reflect the going rate in the 
market. An hourly rate exceeding the prevailing charges for like work may not be justifiable in 
light of the factors in Rule 54(e)(3). Similarly, there may be any number of reasons why the 
hourly rate is lower than market, and a request for the market rates may be reasonable. As we 
have explained, though, a hard rule that the award may be no more than what is spent is 
incorrect. When a district court finds the hourly rate to be reasonable, and there is no legitimate 
basis to deviate from it-up or down-any such deviation misapplies the appropriate legal 
standard and is not the product of an exercise of reason. 
3 The providers cite two cases that they apparently think demonstrate that courts should limit fee 
awards to prevent windfalls and penalties. Respondents' Brief, pp. 17, 19. In Griffith v. Clear 
Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 146 Idaho 613, 200 P.3d 1162 (2009), the Court explained that a party 
may switch its basis for seeking fees between a contingent basis and fixed hourly rate, and that 
there may be times "when a party switches the basis of his request for computing fees for the 
sole purpose of creating a windfall for himself' and that the district court exists to ensure that the 
fee award is reasonable. 146 Idaho at 623, 200 P.3d at 1172. The Court did not say, however, 
that awarding fees above what a party spent was necessarily a windfall. In this case, there is no 
windfall because market rates are, as the district court found, reasonable. The other case, Zenner 
v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 210 P.3d 552 (2009), concerned the question whether the factors 
identified in Rule 54( e )(3) applied to a contractual attorney fees provision that called for "actual" 
attorney fees. The rule did not apply, the Court held, since "actual" meant actual and did not 
contemplate a reasonableness inquiry called for in Rule 54. 147 Idaho at 451, 210 P.3d at 559. 
The Court explained that "actual" did not guarantee whatever the contract provided for; like a 
liquidated damages clause, a contractual fee provision may constitute an "unconscionable 
penalty." Id. But, again, the Court did not say that awarding a fee under § 12-120(3) was an 
unconscionable penalty. 
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The providers also do not have an answer for the odd result their and the district court's 
rationale creates. Limiting fees to the amount spent means that the same work will be 
compensated differently depending on who the lawyer's employer is. So, for example, if the 
Department in this case hired outside counsel, the fee request would have likely exceeded $250 
an hour. In such a case, the district court would award that amount, but because the State used 
lawyers on the payroll, it can only recover actual expenses. This does not make sense, and courts 
have correctly rejected it. For starters, market rates are easy ascertainable, and the cost-based 
approach is very complicated and costly. See Illinois v. Sangamo Constr. Co., 657 F.2d at 862 
(use of generally prevailing market rates is "far preferable to extensive judicial scrutiny of 
private fee arrangements or the internal economics of the Attorney General's office"); Corbin, 
845 P.3d at 518.4 
Additionally, courts have found no basis to treat government counsel differently than 
private counsel. The skill, time, expertise, and effort necessary to litigate a case for the 
government is no different than that which is required to litigate a case for a paying client. As a 
district judge from the Northern District of Illinois put it some time ago, attorney fees are a "two-
way street" and it "makes no difference" that the government lawyers are public servants. 
Coleman v. McLaren, 635 F. Supp. 266, 267-68 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
Reading § 12-120(3) to cap fees because that statute exists only to "indemnify the 
prevailing party" the amount it spent is an erroneous interpretation of § 12-120(3 ). There is no 
support for it. Because the district court's interpretation of § 12-120 is erroneous, its 
windfall/penalty approach is at best a decision driven by the district court's sense of fairness 
beyond the permissible considerations enumerated in Rule 54(e)(3) and this Court's cases. 
4 As we explained, the record demonstrates that the SWCAP rate is the same for every lawyer; it 
is not designed to, and does not, capture all costs of using deputy attorneys general to litigate 
cases. Replacement R., p. 83. 
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Without an independent basis to justify the court's departure from what it found to be a 
reasonable rate, the court's sense of the equities is not sustainable on review. Jorgensen v. 
Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 541, 224 P.3d 1125, 1130 (2010). Attorney fee awards are "not the 
proper place to give indirect relief from an adverse judgment" and the "arguably harsh effect of a 
judgment is not an appropriate 'other' factor to consider in fixing attorney fees under Rule 
54(e)(3)." DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 Idaho 288,291,678 P.2d 80, 83 (Ct. App. 1984). 
II. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES IF IT 
PREY AILS IN THIS APPEAL; THE PROVIDERS SHOULD NOT RECOVER 
FEES UNDER§ 12-117 EVEN IF THEY PREY AIL. 
The Department requested attorney fees in its opening brief under § 12-120(3 ), since this 
case concerned a commercial transaction. Appellants' Brief, p. 22. The providers do not contest 
the applicability of § 12-120(3) on appeal. Ergo, if the Department prevails in this appeal, it 
should be awarded reasonable attorney fees. 
The providers say they are entitled to attorney fees, too. They seek fees under §§ 12-
120(3), 12-121, and 12-117. They argue that the Department has pursued this appeal without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Respondents' Brief, p. 20. Should the Department lose this 
appeal, an award of fees against the Department under § 12-117 is not warranted. First they say 
that the Department "frames an issue for this Court's review which does not accurately reflect 
the trial court's decision." Respondents' Brief, p. 20. The Department presented the issue 
whether the district court erred in applying cost-based limitation on government agencies' ability 
to recover attorney fees in its notice of cross-appeal. Replacement R., p. 128. It stated the issue 
on appeal in its opening brief as whether§ 12-120(3) and Rule 54(e)(3) limit a prevailing party's 
recovery to the amount it spent. Appellants' Brief, p. 7. The Department identified and 
discussed both the original basis for the court's ruling (the fee-sharing problem, Appellants' 
IO 
Brief, p. 6 nA) and the basis for the decision on the Department's motion to reconsider. So the 
Department presented and discussed the bases for the district court's decision. There is no merit 
in the providers' argument otherwise. 
Their next argument in support of a fee award under § 12-117 is that the Department 
argued that Idaho trial courts should not consider whether a fee award amounts to a windfall, and 
that the decision whether to award fees exceeding those actually expended is a discretionary call. 
They are mistaken as to what the Department argued. The Department identified the standard of 
review, specifically the requirement that the court act consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the choices before the court. Appellants' Brief, p. 7. This brief and the 
Department's opening brief make clear that the Department argued-with discussion of and 
citation to substantial authority-that there was no legal basis for the district court to award less 
than the requested rate because neither of the district court's legal justifications were correct. 
Third, they say that the Department argued that unless a statute specifies an award of 
actual fees, the trial court should apply prevailing market fees to the exclusion of the other 
factors in Rule 54(e)(3). This, too, is defied by a simple reading of the Department's brief. The 
Department argued that the limitation the district court imposed was an impermissible 
construction of§ 12-120(3), and that in this case, there was no other legitimate basis to award a 
lesser amount. The Department simply pointed out that this Court has said that "actual" and 
"reasonable" do not necessarily always align. There is, as the Department pointed out, authority 
for this argument. Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 450, 210 P.3d 552, 558 (2009). The 
providers offered zero authority in their brief to respond to this plain proposition. 
Fourth, the providers argue that the Department's appeal "essentially requests that the 
State profit from its use of in-house counsel and that profit should be re-allocated according to 
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the state's needs versus deposited in the Attorney General's fund." Respondents' Brief, p. 21. 
Again, the Department's argument has been consistent: Where a district court finds that the 
hourly rate is reasonable, and there is no basis to award something less, the hourly rate should be 
the requested hourly rate. This Court's cases do not limit the recoverable hourly rate to that 
which the prevailing party spent; what the client may do with it is irrelevant. 
And finally, the providers argue that the Department's appeal does no more than invite 
this Court to second-guess conflicting evidence, and that the law is well-settled and the 
Department has made no showing that the district court misapplied the law. The Department's 
briefs speak for themselves. The Court should not take seriously the providers' unfounded 
claim. Indeed, the providers' brief largely consists of quotes from the district court's decision 
and comments from the bench, summaries of those comments, some citations to cases, and then 
offers conclusory pronouncements that the district court got it right. If there is a party in this 
appeal that is entitled to fees under § 12-11 7, it is not the providers. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the district court's award of attorney fees and remand with 
instructions to award the Department attorney fees in the amount requested, $74,925.00. This 
Court should also award the Department reasonable attorney fees under§ 12-120(3). 
Dated April 20, 2016. 
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